Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects by Colin Stoneman

Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects by Colin Stoneman

Author:Colin Stoneman [Stoneman, Colin]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138741874
Google: drsutAEACAAJ
Goodreads: 39949147
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2000-10-01T00:00:00+00:00


The Scale of Redistribution

Zimbabwe’s programme dwarfs all prior voluntary resettlement programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Some 3.5 million hectares of land, 84 percent of it acquired from the large-scale commercial farming subsector, had been committed to the programme between 1980 and late 1996 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996b). In terms of accomplishments compared to target numbers and deadlines, however, Zimbabwe’s programme lags far behind its own implementation schedule.

The programme can also be criticised for the dilution over time of its poverty-alleviation goal. Changes in selection criteria in 1990 to emphasise farming experience and possession of agricultural capital led one observer to conclude, ‘There has been…an abandonment of the earlier commitment to redistributive justice’ (Dashwood, 1996). Despite clear evidence that what has been called ‘the myth of unproductive peasants’ (Weiner et al, 1991) is merely that - a myth, the state also appears happy to preserve a dualistic structure through transferring title in large holdings from white to black owners.

Target-setting has haunted the programme. The initial target, set in 1980, was 18,000 families to be resettled on 1.1 million hectares of land at a cost of Z$60 million. This figure was derived not from an assessment of need, but rather from calculations of what could be accomplished under the joint British-Zimbabwean programme launched after independence. This initial modest target proved attainable and, by 1987,40,000 households had been resettled on two million hectares (Cusworth and Walker, 1988).

Within two years of independence, a revised target of 162,000 households (on nine million hectares at a cost of Z$500 million) was published in the Transitional National Development Plan (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982). While this figure was acknowledged to be no more than a guess (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996a), it proved to be wildly optimistic in terms of what would be accomplished. Commenting on the enduring failure to meet targets despite a rhetorical commitment to land redistribution, one observer notes (Goebel, 1998):

While government primarily blames lack of funds for land purchase and infrastructural development, other factors stalling the establishment of sufficient numbers of schemes to meet demand include the centrality of commercial agriculture to the Zimbabwean economy, pressure from multilateral institutions to protect commercial farming, government corruption through which acquired land is given to ministers and other government friends, and flagging commitment on the part of the new black elite housed in government to the welfare of the poor masses.

Fifteen years after it first became operational, Zimbabwe’s resettlement programme ‘had never been evaluated to determine the strengths and weaknesses as well as the need for its redesign’ (Government of Zimbabwe, 1995). Despite the absence of a comprehensive review, major developments took place throughout this period which affected significantly the policies and procedures guiding the programme. Examples include the first and second 5-year national development plans in 1986 and 1991, the adoption of a new land policy in 1990, enactment of a new land acquisition act in 1992 and its revision in 1996, the introduction of structural adjustment in 1991, the hearings and report of the Land Tenure Commission (LTC), and - most recently - major revisions to land policy (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996b).



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